Exploring the Behavior of Economic Agents: the role of relative preferences by Joseph Cavanaugh & Michelle Alexopoulos
Exploring the Behavior of Economic Agents: the role of
relative preferences 
Michelle Alexopoulos Stephen Sapp
University of Toronto University of Western Ontario
Abstract
Standard economic theory assumes individuals choose actions that optimize their expected
utility. In this paper we investigate how the existence of players with non−standard
preferences may influence economic agents' behavior in some of the most frequently studied
non−cooperative games. We find that allowing for the existence of agents with relative
preferences can help explain observed economic actions which, at times, appear
counter−intuitive.
We would like to thank Kyle Bagwell and Mark Witte for many helpful discussions. All errors remain, however, our own.
Citation: Alexopoulos, Michelle and Stephen Sapp, (2006) "Exploring the Behavior of Economic Agents: the role of relative
preferences." Economics Bulletin, Vol. 12, No. 2 pp. 1−7
Submitted: February 12, 2006.  Accepted: February 21, 2006.
URL: http://www.economicsbulletin.com/2006/volume12/EB−06L20001A.pdf  1
1. Introduction 
In most economic models, individuals are assumed to be rational and maximize their 
expected utility.  There is, however, increasing evidence that some agents' utility depends on 
both their own payoff and the payoffs of others. Therefore, an individual's satisfaction may 
depend on how much he receives relative to those in a reference group. 
In this note we demonstrate how agents with this type of preferences (relative 
preferences) can affect the outcomes predicted by the standard Cournot and Stackelberg models.  
We show that the positive profits obtained by firms in the Cournot model disappear when both 
players have relative preferences, and overall profits decline when at least one player has relative 
preferences.  Outcomes are also affected in the Stackelberg model.  For example, the first mover 
advantage disappears when the second mover has relative preferences, and the competitive 
outcome is obtained when both have relative preferences. These results may help explain why 
industries with very few agents may appear to behave in a competitive fashion even though the 
traditional Cournot or Stackelberg games predict a different outcome. 
The remainder of this note is developed as follows. In Section 2, we review evidence on 
the existence of relative preferences and discuss how they may help explain behavior in some 
industries. In Section 3, we examine how agents with relative preferences can influence the 
outcomes of Cournot and Stackelberg games, and Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Why Relative Preferences? 
Although economic agents strive to maximize their expected utility, recent research 
indicates that individuals may care about how their payoffs compare to those of others and not 
just the level of their payoff
1. Consequently, it is important to understand how differences in 
these preferences may affect observed economic behavior.  Most of the existing work in this area 
has used surveys to investigate how individuals' satisfaction depends on relative versus absolute 
differences in factors such as income and wealth
2.  An interesting example is Solnik and 
Hemenway (1998) who ask a group of faculty, staff and graduate students to choose between two 
scenarios. In one they receive $50,000 per year while everyone else gets $25,000 whereas in the 
other they would earn $100,000 per year but everyone else receives twice as much.   
Interestingly, even though nothing else differed across scenarios, most of the subjects preferred 
to earn less as long as their relative standing was higher. 
Recognizing the existence of such relative preferences, several economists have tried to 
theoretically model these concepts. For example, in the fair-wage models of Akerlof (1982) and 
Akerlof and Yellen (1988, 1990), individuals have relative preferences and the level of their 
wages relative to others affects the amount of effort they supply. Similarly, Levine (1998) 
explores models where agents act cooperatively, but retaliate if they feel unfairly treated.  
Although past work has characterized and identified the presence of individuals with 
relative preferences, little has been done to characterize their potential impact on the observed 
economic behavior of firms.  It is not implausible for firms to behave as if they have relative 
preferences since executive compensation is based on a comparison of firm performance to the 
performance of other, similar firms.  As a result, managers will focus their actions on improving 
                                                 
1 While the psychology literature provides the majority of studies investigating the individuals' preferences, 
theoretical studies like Samuelson (2004) are becoming more common in the economics literature. 
 
2 See e.g., Easterlin (1995), Duncan (1975), Neumark and Postlewaite (1993), and Solnik and Hemenway (1998). 
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the performance of their firm relative to a set of peer/competitor firms (for a nice discussion see 
Porac, Wade and Pollock (1999)).  Consistent with this, there are many occasions on which we 
see this type of behavior.  For example, many firms appear to maximize their market share at the 
expense of profits (e.g., North American car makers are currently offering significant incentives 
to try to maintain market share at the expense of profitability). 
Below, we illustrate how incorporating firms (economic agents) with these preferences 
into our models can impact economic outcomes.  By using relative preferences our results help 
explain why we observe some firms making choices which result in losses for them and their 
competitors even when it is clear that the losses are unlikely to drive the competitors out of the 
market or change their behavior. 
 
3. Impact of Relative Preferences 
We explore how agents with relative preferences may affect behavior in the Cournot and 
Stackelberg models of inter-firm competition. In all cases, we assume players (firms) make 
choices to maximize their expected payoff.  We consider the following cases: 1) both players are 
profit-maximizing (the standard case), 2) both players maximize relative standing (have relative 
preferences), and 3) the case in which the players are different types
3. In our models, the per-unit 
cost of production is c>0, the price of production falls as output increases and the price function 
is differentiable (i.e., p′(y1+y2)<0 where yi is the output of player i). 
 
3.1. Cournot Model of Inter-firm Competition 
The first model we consider is the Cournot model of inter-firm competition. In the 
benchmark case (Case 1), both players are profit-maximizers.  Let y1 be the output produced by 
player 1 and y2 be the output produced by player 1’s competitor
4.  Player 1’s reaction function, 





 p(y1 + y2)y1 - cy1. Similarly, the reaction function for player 2 is p′(y1 + y2)y2 + 
p(y1 + y2) – c = 0. Together these equations give the standard result that both firms produce equal 
amounts, y1 = y2, and each makes a positive profit of p(2y1)y1 - cy1. 
In the second case we consider, both players have relative preferences so the objective 
functions take into account that each player cares about how their profits compare to their 
opponent's.  As a result, each player's reaction function is determined by solving the 
corresponding version of this problem:  
1
max
y  [p(y1 + y2)y1 - cy1] - [p(y1+y2)y2 - cy2] 
This implies that the FONCs for player 1 are p′(y1 + y2)(y1 - y2) + p(y1 + y2) – c = 0,  and  
p′(y1 + y2)(y2 - y1) + p(y1 + y2) – c = 0 for player 2.  Therefore, y1 = y2 and p(2y1) = c in 
equilibrium, and neither firm makes a profit because the competitive outcome is achieved.  
In Case 3, we start by assuming that the players have opposite preferences, so we assume 
that player 1 maximizes profits, while player 2 has relative preferences.  Consequently player 1’s 
reaction function is the same as in Case 1, p′(y1 + y2)y1 + p(y1 + y2) – c = 0, and player 2’s 
                                                 
3 This third case is consistent with results we obtained through survey evidence and Solnik and Hemenway's (1998) 
finding that between 20%-50% of individuals may have relative preferences so we may have situations in which 
there are players with different preferences. 
 
4  Note: although we only use two players, the results can be generalized to the case where there are n players.   3
reaction function is p′(y1 + y2)(y2 - y1) + p(y1 + y2) – c = 0 (as in Case 2). Combining these 
functions shows y1 = ½y2, i.e., player 2 (with relative preferences) produces twice as much as 
player 1 (the profit-maximizer). Each firm makes positive profits since p(3y2) = c - p′(3y2)y2/2 > 
c, but player 1’s profits are smaller than player 2’s.  This means player 1 will get less than when 
both players have standard preferences.  As a result, as player 1 believes it is more likely their 
opponent is playing with relative preferences the more likely it is that player 1 will choose a 
more aggressive strategy. 
 
3.2. Stackelberg Model of Inter-firm Competition 
For the Stackelberg model, the first player moves in advance of the second.  We consider 
four cases where the players either maximize profits or their relative standing.  In the standard 
case (Case 1), both players maximize profits and the second player faces the following problem, 
taking player 1’s actions as given:  
2
max
y  p(y1 + y2)y2 - cy2 
The FONC for this problem, p′(y1 + y2)y2 + p(y1 + y2) – c = 0, allows us to express player 2’s 
output as a function of player 1’s output, y2 = f(y1).  Knowing this relationship, player 1 then 
chooses how much to produce by solving the following problem:  
1
max
y  p(y1 + f(y1))y1 - cy1 
which implies: p′(y1 + f(y1))[ 1 + f′(y1)]y1 + p(y1 + y2) = c.  Combining this expression with the 
second player’s FONC gives: y2 = [1 + f′(y1)]y1.  It follows that firms make positive profits and, 
if f′(y1) < 0, we get the standard result that there is a first mover advantage with the first player's 
payoff being higher than the second player's, y2 < y1.  
In the second case (Case 2), both players have relative preferences.  Similar to Case 1, the 




y  [p(y1 + y2)y2 - cy2] - [p(y1 + y2)y1 - cy1] 
The resulting FONC, p′(y1 + y2)(y2 - y1) + p(y1 + y2) – c = 0, again gives the relationship 
between the second player's output and the first player's output, (i.e., y2 = f(y1)). Player 1 takes 
this relationship into account when choosing his profit-maximizing level of output:  
1
max
y  [p(y1 + f(y1))y1 - cy1] - [p(y1 + f(y1))f(y1) - cf(y1)] 
Combining the FONC, p′(y1 + f(y1))[ 1 + f’(y1)] (y1 - f(y1)) + ( p(y1 + y2) - c) (1 - f’(y1)) = 0, 
with player 2’s FONC gives the result y2 = y1. Unlike Case 1, there is no first mover advantage 
when both players have relative preferences. Furthermore, the competitive solution is achieved 
and neither player earns positive profits since y2 = y1, and p(y1 + y2) = c. Intuitively, this occurs 
because players with relative preferences only care about their position relative to their 
competitors. Consequently if the first mover tried to produce a lot to generate more profits than 
his competitor, the second mover would not be deterred from producing a large quantity since: 1) 
he wants to minimize the distance between his profits and player 1’s, and 2) he knows that the 
first mover's profits will fall as he produces more. Consequently, when both have relative 
preferences neither firm ends up making a positive profit in equilibrium.  
Case 3, where player 1 has profit-maximizing preferences and player 2 has relative 
preferences, the outcome can be seen to be the reverse of Case 1. Therefore in this case we 
would observe a second mover advantage (as opposed to the first mover advantage in Case 1).    4
In the last Case we consider (Case 4), the first mover has relative preferences, while the 
second mover is a profit-maximizer. Here, player 2 faces the same problem as in Case 1, and the 
FONC, p′(y1 + y2)y2 + p(y1 + y2) – c = 0, gives player 2’s reaction function, y2 = f(y1).  Player 1 
recognizes this when he chooses how much to produce. Specifically he maximizes:  
1
max
y  [ p(y1 + f(y1))y1 - cy1] - [p(y1 + f(y1))f(y1) - cf(y1)] 
which implies: 
p′(y1 + f(y1))[1 + f′(y1)](y1 - f(y1)) + (p(y1 + y2) - c)(1 - f’(y1)) = 0 
Combining this expression with player 2's FONC, we find that y1 = 2y2 / [1 + f’(y1)]. Thus, there 
is a first mover advantage (y1 > y2) as long as f′(y1) + 1 < 2. This occurs because: 1) player 2 
only cares about his profit, and 2) player 1 knows that as he produces more, player 2 will 
produce less to keep his profit level up.  
We have solved the above problems assuming that the players know one another’s types. 
However, this may not be the case in general.  Under uncertainty an individual will assign 
probabilities to what kind of agent he is facing and maximize the corresponding expected profits. 
Based on the results from the cases described above we can draw some inferences about the 
behavior of agents in this case.  For example, contrary to the Cournot case, our results for the 
Stackelberg model indicate that player 1’s behavior will become less aggressive (i.e., submitting 
smaller quantities) as his belief that player 2 has relative preferences increases. 
 
3.3. An Example: 
To more clearly illustrate how the presence of agents with relative preferences can affect 
the outcome of different economic situations, we evaluate each of the above cases using the 
pricing function: p(y1 + y2) = A - (y1 + y2).  Table 1 reports, in each case, the quantity each 
player produces, the associated profits, and each player's payoff (given their preferences and that 
each player knows the type of the player they are facing). 
In the Cournot case, we see that: 1) the presence of a competitor with relative preferences 
decreases the profits earned by profit-maximizers and decreases the overall profits for both 
players (Case 3), and 2) profits completely disappear when both players have relative preferences 
(Case 2). Consequently, the results are much closer to the competitive outcome when there is at 
least one player with relative preferences. 
For the Stackelberg case, we see that profits are driven to zero when both players have 
relative preferences (Case 2). When only the second player has relative preferences (Case 3), 
profits are positive, but now player 2 has a second mover advantage and earns profits 
significantly higher than player 1’s - in fact, the quantities and profits in Case 3 are exactly 
opposite those in Case 1 where player 1 has the first mover advantage.  Finally, in Case 4 the fact 
that player 1 has relative preferences causes his profits to be four times larger than the profits of 
player 2 (instead of only twice as large as in Case 1). Here, the first mover forgoes earning a 
higher profit (i.e., (A - c)
2 / 8 as in Case 1 in favor of profits of (A - c)
2 / 9), because by 
producing more, he hurts his opponent's profits more than his own which maximizes the 
difference between his profits and his opponent's. 
While none of the profits in our example are negative, this was, at least partially, due to 
our choice of cost function.  If we were to assume there are both variable and fixed costs of 
production, the results could change. For example, if profits were given by π = p(yi + y-i)yi - cyi - 
φ for all players, the quantities produced would be the same as reported in Table 1 but the profits 
would be decreased by the size of the fixed cost, φ, (unless fixed costs are high enough to induce 
profit maximizing agents not to produce). As a result, negative profits can be the optimal   5
outcome in cases where both players had relative preferences and φ is large enough
5.  Moreover, 
since individuals with relative preference focus on their relative profits as opposed to the 
absolute profit levels, they may be willing to continue to play while incurring negative profits 
with uncertain perspectives for future profits (e.g., incur sustained losses as in the airline 
industry) provided they are able to finance these losses.  
 
4. Conclusions 
An increasing amount of evidence suggests that all individuals do not behave according 
to standard preferences. In this note we examine how the predictions of Cournot and Stackelberg 
games can be affected by the presence of agents who have relative preferences.  In this 
environment the payoff of agents with relative preferences is determined by the magnitude of the 
difference between his profit and his opponent's - not the absolute value of his profit as in most 
standard models.  Our results may help explain why firms are frequently willing to continue to 
lose money in certain markets and why outcomes in markets with a small number of firms may 
appear competitive even though standard Cournot and Stackelberg games suggest this should not 
occur. 
 
                                                 
5 Profit-maximizing players may be hesitant to continue under such circumstances, but there is evidence that some 
players react to the behavior of their competitors by adopting similar preferences in subsequent periods (e.g. ''tit-for-
tat'' strategies) or retaliating.  Consequently both may eventually play according to relative preferences and thus 
continue to participate by focusing on payoffs rather than profits leading to the outcomes described above.   6
Table 1a) Theoretical Outcomes for the Cournot Example with Agents having different 
preferences: 
 
  Case  1 Case 2 Case  3 
Player 1 2 1 2 1 2 
Quantity 
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Table 1b) Theoretical Outcomes for the Stackelberg Example with Agents having different 
preferences: 
 
  Case 1  Case 2  Case 3  Case 4 
Player  1 2 1  2  1 2 1 2 
Quantity 
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